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Abstract
Using unique real estate data that allows for accurately-measured capital gains, we
examine whether sell propensities and selling prices depend on an owner’s capital gain.
We find that sell propensities are higher and selling prices are lower for properties with a
capital gain, with the sell propensities experiencing a discontinuity at a zero capital gain.
Consistent with realization utility (Barberis and Xiong, 2012), larger capital gains are
associated with higher sell propensities and lower selling prices. Overall, our evidence
provides empirical support for realization utility, while alternative explanations such as
financing constraints and informed trading cannot explain our findings.
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1 Introduction
A large literature examines the impact of capital gains on investor decisions. According to
the disposition effect, positions with an unrealized capital gain are more likely to be sold than
those with an unrealized capital loss (Odean, 1998; Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Weber and
Camerer, 1998). This reluctance of investors to realize their losses is commonly known as
loss aversion (Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean, 2007). The usual explanation for the disposition
effect is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, Barberis and Xiong (2009)
demonstrate that realized gains and realized losses predict the disposition effect more reliably
than unrealized gains and unrealized losses. Therefore, Barberis and Xiong (2012) introduce
realization utility, a theory in which investors obtain utility from realizing a capital gain
and disutility from realizing a capital loss. Furthermore, realizing a large capital gain yields
greater utility than realizing a small capital gain in their theory. Although Frydman, Barberis,
Camerer, Bossaerts, and Rangel (2014) provide experimental support for realization utility,
there exists less empirical support for realization utility.
Tests of the disposition effect typically compare the aggregate sell propensity of all gains,
irrespective of their magnitudes, to the aggregate sell propensity of all losses (Odean, 1998).
However, Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) argue that the disposition effect implies a dis-
continuity in the sell propensity at a zero capital gain. As illustrated by Figure 1a, this
discontinuity indicates a sign realization preference that implies investors prefer to sell po-
sitions with a small capital gain rather than a small capital loss. Using the stock trades of
individual investors, these authors find no discontinuity in the sell propensity at a zero capital
gain. Therefore, Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) conclude that stock investors do not have
a sign realization preference.
Realization utility theory predicts that the sell propensities experience a discontinuity at
a zero capital gain, then increase with the magnitude of a capital gain. Realization utility
in Barberis and Xiong (2012) also predicts that the sell propensities are flat over the capital
loss region since losses are only realized because of exogenous liquidity shocks. Figure 1b
illustrates the sell propensities predicted by their model of realization utility. Comparing
Figure 1b to 1a, the sign realization preference is a necessary condition for the disposition
effect and realization utility, while the magnitude realization preference provides an additional
necessary condition for realization utility.
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This paper applies the recently developed sign and magnitude realization preference tests
to real estate transactions. Real estate transactions are well suited for these tests because
Barberis and Xiong (2012) argue that a real estate investment constitutes an investing episode
with a salient reference price and a distinct mental account. With stock transactions, the
ability to buy and sell a different number of shares at different prevailing prices at different
points in time obscures the reference price. Individual investors may also be more emotionally
invested in real estate transactions, which are far larger and less frequent than their stock
transactions. Conversely, individual investors have strong incentives to avoid the negative
wealth implications of suboptimal real estate decisions. Gan (2010) documents the real estate
market’s importance to consumption. Real estate transactions, unlike stock transactions,
are also conducted during a lengthy escrow period, which affords investors an opportunity
to reflect before finalizing their decision. Overall, it is an empirical question as to whether
realization utility affects real estate transactions.
The main challenge to studying realization utility and the disposition effect in the real
estate market is the accurate measurement of unrealized capital gains since individual proper-
ties are often unique and trade in an illiquid market. We overcome these empirical limitations
by using over 280,000 transactions in Singapore’s condominium market, which is comprised
of standardized units within multi-unit condominiums. This standardization allows unit-level
market prices, hence capital gains, to be estimated using transactions within the same con-
dominium. Indeed, a simple hedonic model explains nearly 90% of the variation in unit-level
transaction prices within a typical condominium. Furthermore, the condominium market in
Singapore is liquid. On average, units in our sample are held by their owners for less than
five years before being sold. This liquidity is consistent with the condominium market being
the primary investment vehicle for individual investors in Singapore.
Following Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012), our main empirical tests focus on short holding
periods since these real estate transactions are more likely to have an investment motive and
a salient reference price. We report that units with a capital gain are almost twice as likely to
be sold as units with a capital loss. Probit specifications confirm this result by controlling for
a multitude of unit-level and market-level characteristics, including quarter and condominium
fixed effects. When examining a subset of small capital gains and small capital losses that are
within 20% of the purchase price, units with a capital gain have a sell propensity that is 18.6%
higher than the average unit’s sell propensity. This discontinuity is consistent with investors
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having a sign realization preference, and contrasts with the prior literature’s findings in the
stock market (Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012). Moreover, the sell propensities are increasing
over capital gains, which offers empirical support for realization utility.
Besides studying sell propensities, the real estate market facilitates a novel empirical test
involving the response of selling prices to capital gains. If realizing a capital gain provides
utility, then sellers with a capital gain may accept a lower selling price to complete the trans-
action and immediately obtain this additional utility. This hypothesis cannot be tested in the
the stock market where selling prices are largely exogenous with respect to individual sellers.
We find that units with a capital gain sell for lower prices than comparable units with
a capital loss. Furthermore, as predicted by realization utility, this disparity increases with
the magnitude of a unit’s capital gain and is economically important. Comparing the average
capital gain with the average capital loss, the selling price difference equals nearly six months
of median household income. Moreover, consistent with realization utility, the economic im-
plications associated with the magnitude of an owner’s capital gain are comparable to the
difference between the average capital gain and average capital loss.
Our empirical support for realization utility is robust to alternative explanations. One
alternative explanation for the appearance of realization utility is belief revision. In the stock
market, informed investors are predicted to sell an individual stock position once their positive
private information has been incorporated into the stock’s price and produced a capital gain. A
large capital loss also forces investors to revise their beliefs. Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012)
find that sell propensities in the stock market increase with the magnitude of a position’s
capital gain and, less dramatically, with the absolute magnitude of a position’s capital loss.
Figure 1c provides a visual illustration of the V-shape associated with belief revision. However,
individual property prices in Singapore are less influenced by private information since their
fluctuations are highly correlated due to the country’s small land area and extensive public
transportation. Moreover, the sell propensities in our sample are flat over the loss region, which
is inconsistent with the V-shape predicted by belief revision but consistent with Barberis and
Xiong (2012)’s theory of realization utility.
Another possible justification for the appearance of realization utility is mean reversion.
However, property prices in Singapore do not exhibit negative autocorrelation. Instead, the
autocorrelation in property prices is positive over a one quarter horizon and insignificant over
longer horizons. Furthermore, real estate investors in Singapore that sell their unit to realize
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a capital gain likely reinvest the sale proceeds in another property. In a real estate market
where expected returns are highly correlated across individual properties, the realization of a
capital gain is difficult to justify without realization utility.
Stein (1995) demonstrates that financing constraints can be an explanation for the higher
sell propensity of properties with a capital gain. Specifically, an owner’s existing property
represents a large fraction of their wealth that is financed with debt. Thus, a rise in its price
increases the equity available to finance an upgrade. As an owner’s capital gain is a component
of their equity, financing constraints predict that the sell propensities increase linearly with
the magnitude of their capital gain, as in Figure 1d.1
Our estimation procedure includes several proxies for financing constraints to account for
their influence on unit-level sell propensities. As mortgages in Singapore are standardized
with government-mandated minimum down payments and common mortgage rates, we esti-
mate owner equity by aggregating down payments and subsequent principal payments. This
aggregate amount captures the component of owner equity that is not attributable to a unit’s
capital gain. Thus, conditional on a unit’s capital gain, greater owner equity corresponds with
weaker financing constraints. Another proxy for financing constraints is unique to Singapore:
whether the owner used to reside in public housing. All our empirical results and conclusions
regarding realization utility are robust to including these proxies for financing constraints.
Moreover, the discontinuity in the sell propensities at a zero capital gain is inconsistent with
financing constraints, as are the flat sell propensities over capital losses.
Our study is not the first to examine the importance of capital gains in the real estate
market. Genesove and Mayer (2001) report that condominium owners in Boston with a capital
loss list their units for sale at higher prices. However, their study cannot explicitly test for
the disposition effect or realization utility because listings data is insufficient to estimate sell
propensities.2 Estimating capital gains in Boston is also complicated by unobservable property
attributes and renovations that affect a unit’s market price. Consequently, the analysis in
Genesove and Mayer (2001) is limited to having an indicator function for listed properties
1While the average sell propensity of units with a capital gain is higher than the average sell propensity of
units with a capital loss in all four panels of Figure 1, only the disposition effect and realization have the sign
realization preference.
2In addition, listings data may exclude properties with a capital loss since the listing of a property signals
the owner’s intention to sell. The disposition effect and realization utility both predict that properties with a
capital loss are less likely to be sold, and therefore are less likely to be listed.
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that likely have a capital loss. In contrast, our data allows capital gain magnitudes to be
accurately estimated for nearly the entire condominium market, along with sell propensities
conditional on these magnitudes. Thus, we are able to investigate whether the sign realization
preference and magnitude realization preference affect real estate transactions.
Our results have important implications regarding the response of investors to unrealized
capital gains and unrealized capital losses. Prior studies involving stock market transactions
such as Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) have not found empirical support for realization
utility and the disposition effect due to the lack of empirical support for the sign realization
preference. In contrast, our study of real estate transactions finds that investors are more
likely to realize capital gains than capital losses, even when their (absolute) magnitudes are
small. We also find evidence that a unit’s sell propensity increases with the magnitude of
its capital gain. This magnitude realization preference is consistent with realization utility.
Furthermore, the magnitude realization preference impacts selling prices since owners appear
willing to accept a lower selling price if their unit has a capital gain. Overall, our empirical
evidence indicates that capital gains and capital losses affect transaction volume and prices
in the real estate market in accordance with realization utility.
2 Data
Our data is from Singapore’s private condominium market. A typical condominium in Sin-
gapore consists of 200-300 units located in several high-rise buildings. The average building
height is 15 floors in our sample and each unit is approximately 1,300 square feet. Units are
largely homogeneous within the same condominium but differ in terms of their size and floor
level. Indeed, owners require approval to remove any walls, and are not allowed to install
windows and doors that alter the condominium’s original design. Therefore, unobservable
attributes exert a minimal impact on unit-level prices per square foot (PSF).
Sale transactions involving condominiums are reported to a government agency in Singa-
pore known as the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA). URA lists the details of each
transaction on a public website, usually within two weeks of a transaction. As a result, prop-
erty investors can use observed transaction prices within their condominium to infer their
unit’s market price, and compute its associated unrealized capital gain or unrealized capital
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loss.3 The absence of capital gain taxes in Singapore mitigates the need to examine capital
gains after tax.
We obtain sale transactions data from URA’s Real Estate Information System, a subscrip-
tion service known as REALIS. This database records the transaction date, condominium
name, transaction price, unit size, street address, floor level, and unit number. A recent paper
by Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel (2015) also utilize the URA data in their study of long-term
discount rates. Unlike studies of the disposition effect that have to estimate historical purchase
prices (Grinblatt and Han, 2005), the URA data provides a nearly complete set of historical
purchase prices in Singapore that serve as reference prices in our analysis. Consistent with the
liquidity and homogeneity of Singapore’s real estate market, transaction costs are relatively
low with real estate agents earning a 1-2% fee from sellers.
Our URA data begins in 1995 and ends in 2012. After excluding condominiums with
less than 50 transactions in this sample period, a total of 282,920 transactions remain. For
certain units, we find a size discrepancy on different transaction dates. After excluding units
whose size discrepancy exceeds 2%, our sample contains 277,856 transactions involving 1,104
condominiums and 185,383 unique units.
2.1 Capital Gain Estimation
In order to estimate a unit’s capital gain, the unit’s most recent purchase price is required.
Since URA data begins in 1995, property purchases that occur before 1995 are unobservable.
We begin our capital gain estimation procedure in 1998 to ensure that three years of past
transactions are available. Table 1 reports the number of units for which past purchase prices
are available each quarter from 1998-2012. The available number of units increases over time
as more units are sold and enter the URA records. We also compare the number of available
units to the entire stock of condominium units in Singapore, and report the relevant sample
coverage estimates in Table 1.4 By the end of 2012, our sample coverage is nearly 83%. This
coverage does not reach 100% because some units are purchased before 1995 and are not sold
during our sample period. However, the long holding periods associated with these missing
units indicate that their owners are unlikely to be property investors. Indeed, to identify real
3Real estate transactions in Singapore are often completed without a professional appraisal.
4We estimate the total housing stock using the website http://www.propertyguru.com.sg/ that records the
total number of units in each condominium.
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estate transactions that are most likely to have an investment motive, our study focuses on
units whose holding period is three years or less.
Table 1 reports an upward trend in Singapore property prices that coincides with con-
siderable price volatility. In Han (2010), price uncertainty in the real estate market does
not necessarily reduce the demand for property because of incentives to hedge against price
increases. These hedging incentives are particulary strong in Singapore due to the high cross-
correlation in property prices, desire to upgrade, limited availability of land, and population
growth (Han, 2013).
According to Table 1, the average price of a residential condominium unit in a typical
quarter is S$1,046,226, which is equivalent to $666,386 using the average exchange rate of
1.57 SGD per USD during the 1998-2012 period. The average PSF equals S$886 (equivalent
to $512). Figure 2 plots the average PSF and transaction volume each quarter from 1995 to
2012. The 0.684 correlation between the average PSF and transaction volume highlights the
positive price-volume relation in the real estate market.
To measure each unit’s capital gain, we estimate a hedonic pricing model within each con-
dominium by regressing unit-level per square foot transaction prices on quarterly dummies.
This method controls for condominium-specific characteristics such as location, age, facilities,
and quality. Neighborhood characteristics are also accounted for by this methodology.5 Con-
dominiums that average fewer than two sale transactions per quarter are excluded from the
pricing model. An extended pricing model contains each unit’s log size (square feet) and floor
level to supplement the quarterly dummies
PSFi,t =
Q4 2012∑
t=Q1 1995
βt Quartert + βs Log(Size)i + βf Floor Leveli + i,t . (1)
The coefficients for both models are estimated within the entire 1995 to 2012 sample period
using all units indexed by i having sale transactions in quarter t that are located within the
same condominium. We then report the distribution of the coefficients across the condomini-
ums. Table 2 reports an average R2 of 74% for the simple pricing model that contains only
quarterly dummy variables. Hence, a condominium’s average quarterly PSF explains nearly
three-quarters of the price variation across units within the same condominium.
5Agarwal, Rengarajan, and Sing (2014) find that school districts in Singapore impact condominium prices,
although their effects are economically small in comparison to the capital gains in our study.
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The inclusion of size and floor characteristics in the extended pricing model increases the
average R2 to 88%. According to Table 2, the average βs coefficient is -0.13 (average t-statistic
of 8.90) across all quarters and condominiums. Thus, large units sell at a discount in terms
of their PSF. The average βf coefficient is 7.15 (average t-statistic of 6.13), indicating a price
premium for units on higher floors. Overall, the results from Equation (1) demonstrate that
unobservable unit-level attributes exert little impact on per square foot prices.
We then use the condominium-level coefficients from the extended hedonic model to esti-
mate unit-level market prices within each condominium. A unit’s estimated per square foot
price in quarter t, denoted ˆPSFi,t, is determined by its size and floor level in addition to the
quarterly dummy coefficient for next quarter
ˆPSFi,t = βˆt+1 + βˆs Log(Size)i + βˆf Floor Leveli . (2)
To ensure the accuracy of our hedonic model, we remove condominiums whose R2 from the
hedonic model is below 70%. We use the quarterly dummy coefficient βˆt+1 for next quarter
to avoid underestimating market prices because units are more likely to be sold when market
prices are increasing. In particular, for the full sample, the average selling price premium
computed later in Equation (5) is nearly zero using the predicted PSF from Equation (2).
Nonetheless, our results are similar if the quarterly dummy coefficient βˆt for quarter t replaces
βˆt+1 in Equation (2).
2.2 Financing Constraints
Stein (1995) proposes an alternative explanation for the appearance of the disposition effect
based on financing constraints. As an owner’s property represents a large fraction of their
wealth that is typically debt-financed, price declines tighten their financing constraints by
reducing the sale proceeds available to finance a down payment on a more expensive property.
Thus, price declines tighten the financing constraints of repeat buyers intending to upgrade.
With this tightening being more severe for owners with low equity in their existing property,
we proxy for unit-level owner equity by aggregating the owner’s down payment with their
subsequent monthly principal payments. This sum is then normalized by the unit’s estimated
market price to create a Paid-In Equity measure. While Paid-In Equity is not directly related
to a unit’s capital gain, both alleviate financing constraints.
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We assume that the down payment on a unit equals the government-mandated minimum
based on the prevailing maximum loan-to-value ratio at its purchase date.6 Mortgages in
Singapore are standardized with a maturity of 30 years and an adjustable rate that references
the three-month interbank offer rate in Singapore (SIBOR). The actual mortgage rate is typ-
ically one percent above SIBOR. Data on SIBOR is obtained from the Monetary Authority of
Singapore (www.mas.gov.sg). Variation in the mortgage rate above SIBOR is small compared
to time-series variation in SIBOR. Indeed, as mortgages in Singapore are recourse and default
rates are correspondingly low, the premium above SIBOR is relatively constant across time
and across owners.7
To clarify, fixed-rate 30 year mortgages are not available in Singapore. While Agarwal,
Liu, Torous, and Yao (2014) report that financial sophistication impacts mortgage selection,
this selection decision is not relevant in Singapore where mortgage contracts are standardized.
The standardization of mortgages in Singapore enables monthly principal payments to be
aggregated depending on each unit’s purchase date and the relevant SIBOR time series. The
estimation of owner equity in Genesove and Mayer (1997) has similar assumptions regarding
the common maturity and borrowing rate underlying mortgages. We begin the loan three
months after a unit’s purchase date since housing transactions usually require twelve weeks
to complete in Singapore.
Another financing constraint proxy available in the URA data is whether the owner pre-
viously resided in public housing. A unique feature of Singapore’s housing market is its
segmentation into public units and private (condominium) units. Public housing units are
reserved for low-income households, who usually intend to upgrade to a condominium if their
financial circumstances permit. Although our sample does not contain transactions involving
public housing units, the data does indicate whether the owner was residing in public housing
when they purchased their current private property. Compared to buyers who were residing
in a condominium when they purchased their current condominium unit, former residents of
public housing are more likely to be financially constrained.
We also include two control variables for the tightness of market-level financing constraints
6The Singapore government frequently adjusts the maximum loan-to-value ratio to alter housing prices.
We collect data on these policy changes from various government websites and newspaper articles.
7Consistent with the sunk-cost fallacy, Agarwal, Green, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2015) find that larger down
payments mitigate strategic defaults.
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that vary over time instead of across owners; SIBOR and the government-mandated minimum
down payment (Down Payment, expressed as a percentage of the purchase price) in each
quarter. In terms of corporate lending, Gan (2007) documents tighter financing constraints
following a decline in property prices. Similarly, property price fluctuations can alter financing
constraints by influencing financing costs and down payments.
3 Empirical Results
This section describes the results from our empirical tests involving unit-level sale propensities
and selling prices. To determine the influence of capital gains on real estate transactions, we
examine both the sign and magnitude realization preferences.
3.1 Sell Propensities
Following Odean (1998), we first estimate the following ratio
R =
PGR
PLR
=
Probability of Realizing a Gain
Probability of Realizing a Loss
, (3)
where PGR represents the probability of a gain being realized, which is defined as the percent-
age of units with a capital gain that are sold in quarter t+ 1. Similarly, PLR, the probability
of a loss being realized, is the percentage of units with a capital loss that are sold in quarter
t+ 1. Capital gains and losses are estimated in quarter t using Equation (2).
In unreported results, the ratio R averages 1.765. A t-statistic of 5.13, computed from
the distribution of the ratio’s time series over the sample period, rejects the null hypothesis
that R equals one. Typically, researchers will conclude that this is evidence supporting the
disposition effect. However, Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) argue that the disposition effect
predicts a discontinuity in the sell propensities at a zero capital gain. Conversely, bundling
gains of all magnitudes as a group and comparing them with losses of all magnitudes can lead
to the spurious conclusion that gains matter more to investors than losses without any actual
investor preference for selling capital gains.
As indicated by Figure 1, all four hypotheses (disposition effect, realization utility, belief
revision, and financing constraints) have the average sell propensity of gains being higher than
the average sell propensity of losses. Therefore, instead of comparing these averages, as in
Odean (1998), we implement the sign realization test in Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) and
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the magnitude realization test. Satisfying the sign realization test provides empirical support
for both the disposition effect and realization utility, while providing empirical evidence against
belief revision and financing constraints. Satisfying the additional magnitude realization test
provides further empirical support for realization utility
Figure 3 plots unit-level sell propensities conditional on Gain Magnitude, defined as the
percentage change in a unit’s estimated market price relative to its purchase price (i.e., the
return since purchase). In our main analysis, we focus on units whose holding period is three
years or less. A unit’s holding period refers to the amount of time that has elapsed since its
(most recent) purchase date, not the start of our sample period. Ben-David and Hirshleifer
(2012) argue that short holding periods are more appropriate for testing the disposition ef-
fect. In our analysis, short holding periods are more likely to identify property owners with
investment motives instead of consumption or bequest motives.
In order to plot these sell propensities, we sort each quarter-unit observation into Gain
Magnitude bins whose width is 1%. These bins are imbalanced since smaller capital gains are
more frequent. To ensure that there are sufficient observations within each bin to estimate
a sale probability, we exclude bins with fewer than 100 observations. For each bin, we then
compute the percentage of units sold next quarter. As predicted by realization utility, the top
of Figure 3 presents evidence that a larger capital gain increases a unit’s sell propensity.
We test for the sign realization preference in a subset of units whose capital gains and cap-
ital losses are within 20% of their respective purchase price. The bottom of Figure 3 provides
evidence consistent with a sign preference, as small capital gains are more likely to be realized
than small capital losses. Although a discontinuity in the sell propensities at a zero capital
gain is not visually discernable, later probit estimations detect this discontinuity and conse-
quently support the disposition effect and realization utility. Moreover, the sell propensities
increase with the magnitude of capital gains. Indeed, the kink in the sell propensities starting
at a zero capital gain is consistent with investors deriving greater utility from realizing larger
gains. This magnitude realization preference provides empirical support for realization utility.
The discontinuity in the sell propensities at a zero capital gain in Figure 3 highlights
two important results of our analysis. First, given that the sell propensities kink exactly at
zero, the unit’s purchase price is indeed the reference price utilized by owners. In particular,
transaction costs do not appear to alter the reference price. Second, our estimation of unit-
level market prices, and therefore capital gains, is accurate.
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Consistent with the disposition effect and realization utility, the sell propensities are flat
over the loss region. Ingersoll and Jin (2012) extend Barberis and Xiong (2012) by allowing
reinvestment to motivate the realization of a loss provided the sale proceeds can be reinvested
into another asset with a higher expected return. This extension is important in the stock
market where the value of an investor’s portfolio reflects multiple transactions and there exists
a large cross-section of stocks with different expected returns. However, the assumption in
Barberis and Xiong (2012) that loss realizations are due to forced liquidations applies in
Singapore’s real estate market since mortgage lending is recourse and expected returns are
highly correlated across different properties.
To formally examine the relation between unit-level capital gains and sell propensities, we
estimate a probit model that controls for several unit-level and market-level characteristics
1Sale = Φ (α1 Gain Dummy + α2 Gain Dummy × Gain Magnitude
+α3 Gain Magnitude + γ X) . (4)
The dependent variable, 1Sale, equals one if a unit is sold in quarter t + 1 and capital gains
are estimated in quarter t using Equation (2). Unit-level characteristics include an indicator
function Gain Dummy that equals one if a unit’s capital gain is positive to test for the sign
realization preference. The interaction between Gain Dummy and Gain Magnitude is also
included to test for the magnitude realization preference, while Gain Magnitude by itself tests
the financing constraint hypothesis.
Specifically, the coefficient estimates determine which of the four hypotheses illustrated by
Figure 1 is best supported by the data. The disposition effect predicts a positive α1 coefficient.
Besides predicting a positive α1 coefficient, realization utility also predicts a positive α2 coeffi-
cient. In contrast, financing constraints predict a positive α3 coefficient. Finally, the V-shape
pattern predicted by belief revision requires an insignificant α1 coefficient, positive α2 coef-
ficient, and negative α3 coefficient. The coefficients predicted by each of the four competing
hypotheses involving sell propensities are summarized below:
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Predicted Coefficients
Hypothesis α1 α2 α3
Disposition Effect Positive - -
Realization Utility Positive Positive -
Financing Constraints - - Positive
Belief Revision - Positive Negative
Other independent variables include the length of the unit’s Holding Period (years since
purchase), the log of the unit’s square footage (Size), and the unit’s Floor Level. The latter
two variables are known to have pricing implications based on the results from Equation
(1). For ease of interpretation, the actual floor level is divided by 100, which magnifies its
coefficient by 100. Thus, while the Floor Level coefficients are often statistically significant,
their economic significance is minimal. An indicator function that equals one if the unit’s
owner lived in public housing at the time of its purchase (Public Housing) as well as Paid-In
Equity provide two unit-level proxies for financing constraints in the cross-section.
Two quarterly proxies for market-level financing constraints are also included in our probit
specifications; the SIBOR rate in the prior quarter and the minimum required down payment
expressed as a percentage (e.g. Down Payment of 0.20 denotes a 20% required down payment).
For an individual unit, a higher down payment implies Paid-In Equity is initially higher.
Fluctuations in the minimum down payment stipulated by the government are infrequent,
with increases in this minimum usually occurring in response to dramatic property price
increases. Monthly principal repayments regularly increase Paid-In Equity, with this increase
depending on a unit’s holding period as well as SIBOR.
Table 3 contains the results of the probit based on all capital gains and capital losses for
units with short holding periods of three years or less. For continuous independent variables,
we report the marginal impact on the sell probability when the variable changes by one
standard deviation (half a standard deviation below to half a standard deviation above its
mean). For binary independent variables, the reported marginal effect is the difference in the
sell probability when this variable changes from zero to one. Standard errors in the estimation
are clustered by calendar quarter and z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Observe that the α1 coefficient for Gain Dummy is positive in every specification. Thus,
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the sell propensities increase for units with a capital gain. This finding is consistent with
the disposition effect as well as realization utility. The specification that includes quarter and
condominium fixed effects provides the strictest test to establish whether two units in the same
condominium have different sell propensities in the same quarter due to differences in their
owner’s capital gain. SIBOR and Down Payment are omitted from this specification since
they are collinear with the quarterly fixed effects. As the Gain Dummy coefficient remains
positive in the specification with quarter and condominium fixed effects, units with a capital
gain are more likely to be sold than those with a capital loss.
For the full sample of capital gains, Table 3 provides weak empirical support for realization
utility. However, after conditioning on capital gains and capital losses that are within 20%
of a unit’s purchase price, we find strong empirical support for realization utility due to
the discontinuity in the sell propensity at zero. This discontinuity is also consistent with
the disposition effect. Specifically, the α1 coefficient is positive in every specification. For
example, in the specification with all the control variables, α1 equals 0.16% (t-statistic of
3.55). In terms of economic significance, the 0.0016 coefficient corresponds to 18.6% of the
predicted sale probability in this specification, which is 0.862%.
Besides the discontinuity in the sell propensities at zero, the sell propensities increase with
the magnitude of a unit’s capital gain. In particular, the positive α2 coefficient is consistent
with realization utility. The positive α3 coefficient also contradicts belief revision as larger
capital losses (in absolute value) correspond to lower instead of higher sell propensities. In
contrast to Figure 1c and prior evidence in the stock market, the sell propensities in Figure
3 do not exhibit the V-shape predicted by belief revision. Instead, Figure 3 resembles Figure
1b more than the other three panels since the sell propensities are flat over capital losses,
discontinuous at a zero capital gain, and increasing with larger capital gains. Thus, realization
utility appears to have the strongest empirical support among the four hypotheses.
Although a positive α3 coefficient is consistent with financing constraints, the significance
of the α1 and α2 coefficients is difficult to reconcile with financing constraints. An insignificant
α3 coefficient is also not a necessary condition for realization utility in our study since different
realization utility theories (Ingersoll and Jin, 2012) do not require the sell propensities to be
flat over the loss region. Moreover, the coefficients for the financing constraint proxies offer
contradictory interpretations. Consistent with financing constraints, the negative coefficients
for Pubic Housing suggest that previous residents of public housing, who are more financially
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constrained, are less likely to sell their unit. In contrast, the negative coefficients for Paid-In
Equity and Down Payment are inconsistent with financing constraints as more equity in a unit
reduces its sell propensity.
In summary, capital gains within 20% of a unit’s purchase price exert a significant impact
on unit-level sell propensities in a manner that supports realization utility. Indeed, the α1
and α2 coefficients provide empirical support for both the sign and magnitude realization
preferences, which are necessary conditions for realization utility. Of the four hypotheses
illustrated in Figure 1, the sell propensities indicate that realization utility provides the best
description of investor behavior.
3.2 Selling Prices
Unlike the stock market where selling prices are largely exogenous with respect to the seller,
the real estate market enables us to investigate whether selling prices depend on a real estate
investor’s capital gain. Selling prices are partially endogenous in real estate transactions as
owners decide whether to accept or reject a prospective buyer’s offer. Therefore, we examine
if a unit’s capital gain influences the selling price accepted by its owner.
For each sale transaction, we compute the unit’s selling price premium in the previous
quarter by subtracting one from the ratio of its observed sale price in quarter t+1 normalized
by its estimated market price from Equation (2). This selling price premium is the dependent
variable in the following empirical specification
Selling Price
Estimated Price
− 1 = α0 + α1 Gain Dummy + α2 Gain Dummy × Gain Magnitude
+α3 Gain Magnitude + γ X +  . (5)
The X vector includes multiple control variables that appeared in our earlier probit spec-
ifications, several of which proxy for financing constraints. We estimate Equation (5) by
OLS and the standard errors are clustered by calendar quarter with t-statistics reported in
parentheses.
The important prediction of realization utility is the relevance of a capital gain’s magnitude.
A negative α2 coefficient supports the magnitude realization preference as owners appear
willing to accept a lower selling price in order to realize their capital gain. In contrast to
the selling propensities, a discontinuity in the selling prices at a zero capital gain identified
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by a negative α1 coefficient is less important. Indeed, the sign realization preference is more
difficult to interpret in selling prices since a small unrealized capital gain can result in a small
realized loss if the owner lowers their selling prices too drastically. Nonetheless, realization
utility predicts that sellers with a sufficiently large capital gain accept lower selling prices to
complete the transaction and immediately obtain the utility from realizing a gain. In contrast,
the alternative hypotheses involving financing constraints and belief revision have no selling
price predictions.
Before reporting our estimation results, Figure 4 illustrates the univariate relation between
selling price premiums and capital gains for short-term units (units whose holding period is
three years or less). Each point in this figure represents the average selling price premium for
a particular capital gain magnitude. The capital gains are divided into 1% bins (bins with
fewer than 10 observations are excluded). We observe that selling prices are lower for units
with a larger capital gain. We also observe a discontinuity around a zero capital gain. Units
with a capital loss sell at a slight premium above their estimated market price, while the
selling premium appears to be lower for units with a small capital gain.
The regression coefficients in Table 4 for short-term units confirm the visual evidence in
Figure 4. We find strong evidence in favor of realization utility as the α2 coefficients are
consistently negative. Therefore, owners with a capital gain sell their unit for a lower price.
This acceptance of a lower price is consistent with the higher likelihood of these owners selling
their unit in Table 3. When quarter and condominium fixed effects are added to Equation
(5), support for realization utility remains strong.
Although the evidence in Table 4 indicates that owners with a capital gain are willing to
accept a lower selling price, this evidence does not indicate that these owners sell their unit
below its market price. Across all the sale transactions in our sample, the average capital gain
is approximately 30%. As the selling price premium is negatively associated with capital gains
and the selling price premium has a mean of zero for the whole sample, units with a capital
gain below 30% sell with a positive selling price premium on average, while units with a capital
gain above 30% sell with a negative selling price premium on average. This is apparent from
Figure 4 where the selling premiums are mostly positive (negative) when Gain Magnitude is
below (above) 30%. This visual evidence is confirmed by the regression coefficients in Table
4. For an owner with a 30% capital gain, the coefficients predict a selling price premium near
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0%.8
To understand the economic importance that capital gains exert on selling prices, we
calculate the average selling premium for three different groups of owners who sold their
respective unit within three years of its purchase. The first group consists of owners with a
capital loss. In this first group, an average selling premium of 2.54% is computed from the
sample data underlying Table 4. This premium is determined by the difference between the
average capital loss and the average capital gain. The dollar-denominated price implication
corresponding to the 2.54% difference in the selling premium is equivalent to S$26,574 based
on the average transaction price of S$1,046,226 in our sample. For comparison, the median
annual income of Singaporean households is approximately S$57,000 per annum or S$4,750 per
month during our sample period (www.singstat.gov.sg). Thus, the price difference constitutes
nearly six months of median household income.
As realization utility differentiates between small versus large capital gains, the second
group consists of owners with a relatively small capital gain while the third group consists of
owners with a relatively large capital gain. For units with a short holding period, the median
capital gain of 24% differentiates between owners with a small versus a large capital gain.
The average selling premium for owners in these groups are 1.19% and –0.62%, respectively,
according to the sample data underlying Table 4. These percentages correspond to dollar-
denominated amounts of S$12,450 and –S$6,487, respectively for owners in the second group
and third group. The S$18,937 difference in these amounts illustrates the economic importance
of a capital gain’s magnitude since this magnitude-dependent difference is nearly as large as
the S$26,574 sign-dependent difference. Compared to owners in the first group, owners with a
large capital gain forfeit about seven months of median household income, while owners with
a small capital gain forfeit about three months of median household income.
Conditioning on small capital gains and small capital losses within 20% of the purchase
price also provides strong evidence in favor of realization utility. In particular, the negative
α2 coefficients in Table 4 indicate that selling prices decline with the magnitude of a unit’s
capital gain. Overall, selling prices reveal strong empirical support for realization utility as
larger capital gains are associated with lower selling prices.
By implication, during a period of increasing property prices, a higher number of units
8For example, according to the coefficients of model 2 in Table 4, the selling price premium equals
–0.0134+(–0.0826×0.3)+(0.0352×0.3)+0.0296 = 0.00198, which is close to zero.
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with a capital gain implies higher sell propensities and therefore higher transaction volume.
Consequently, our empirical support for realization utility is able to explain the positive price-
volume relation in real estate.
3.3 Holding Period Length
We repeat our analyses of the sell propensities and selling prices over holding periods whose
length is greater than three years but not more than five years (medium term) and longer
than five years (long term). A longer holding period may indicate a property is being held for
consumption rather than investment.
Comparing the number of observations in Tables 3 through 5 reveals that unit-level holding
periods are bimodal. For example, there are more than twice as many units held for 0–3 years
than for 3–5 years. This means that units are either held for a short or long period, with the
medium holding period serving as a transition between these periods. Intuitively, property
purchases intended as an investment are likely to be sold within three years, with realized
returns determined by Gain Magnitude rather than rental yields. Conversely, the consumption
motive is more likely for units with a long holding period.
Table 5 reports weaker support for realization utility based on sell propensities for units
whose holding period exceeds three years. In particular, as the α2 coefficients are not positive,
the selling propensities do not increase with the magnitude of a unit’s capital gain. Similarly,
Table 6 reports weaker support for realization utility based on selling prices for units whose
holding period exceeds three years.
In summary, evidence of realization utility in real estate transactions is strongest in units
with short holding periods. This finding is consistent with the purchase and sale of these
properties having investment instead of consumption motives.
3.4 Robustness of Discontinuity
As a robustness test, we vary the range of returns over which discontinuities in the sell propen-
sities are estimated. Recall that a discontinuity at a zero capital gain is critically important
for differentiating between financing constraints and either the disposition effect or realization
utility. Our baseline analysis uses capital gain magnitudes that, in absolute value, are within
20% of the purchase price. Since the choice of 20% might be arbitrary, we repeat this analysis
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for units whose absolute capital gain is within 15% and 25% of their purchase price.
The estimated coefficients in Table 7 continue to find a discontinuity in the sell propensities
at a zero capital gain, with the sell propensities also increasing with the magnitude of a unit’s
capital gain. In the specification with quarter and condominium fixed effects, the coefficients
for Gain Dummy are 0.0009 (t-statistic of 2.91) and 0.0014 (t-statistic of 3.51), respectively,
for units whose absolute Gain Magnitude is within 15% and 25%. Thus, the discontinuity in
the sell propensities that supports the disposition effect and realization utility is not driven
by a specific estimation window around zero.
Furthermore, in the same subset of units, Table 8 indicates that selling prices trend down-
ward as the magnitude of a unit’s capital gain increases. For the specification with quarter
and condominium fixed effects, the α1 coefficients are -0.0095 (t-statistic of 2.73) and -0.0097
(t-statistic of 4.31), respectively, for units whose absolute capital gain is within 15% and 25%
of their purchase price. These negative coefficients continue to provide empirical support for
realization utility.
4 Alternative Explanations
Several alternative explanations for our results were evaluated. However, these alternatives
are less plausible than our conclusion that real estate transactions are influenced by realization
utility.
4.1 Belief Revision
Informed trading (speculative motivation for trading) provides an alternative explanation for
the appearance of the disposition effect. Informed trading can explain the high selling propen-
sities of stock investors once the stock price has incorporated their good private information
and created a capital gain.9 Informed trading can also explain the delay in selling positions
with a capital loss, and may motivate further purchases at a lower price, provided good private
9Crane and Hartzell (2010) examine the property investments of 266 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
and find that REIT managers are subject to the disposition effect. However, their results regarding professional
managers in commercial real estate are more difficult to disentangle from informed trading, especially by REIT
managers with a broad investment mandate and portfolios containing multiple properties.
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information is eventually expected to increase the stock price.10
However, unlike the stock market, informed trading in Singapore’s real estate market is
less important since private information does not determine unit-level market prices. Instead,
unit-level prices in Singapore’s real estate market are driven by market-level price fluctuations.
Thus, belief revision is less relevant to the relation between sell propensities and capital gains
in our sample than in Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012)’s study of the stock market. Moreover,
owners that sell their unit to realize a capital gain likely reinvest the sale proceeds in another
property with a similar expected return. While owners of multiple properties may attempt
to rebalance their real estate portfolio, this rebalancing is also ineffective because of the high
cross-correlation between unit-level property prices. Thus, in a market with homogeneous
expected returns, realization utility offers a better explanation than belief revision for the
realization of capital gains.
4.2 Mean Reversion
Another alternative explanation for our results is an expectation of mean reversion in property
prices. Table 9 reports the autocorrelation in market-level price changes at both an annual
and quarterly frequency. These price changes are defined as the percentage change in the
market-level PSF over a specific horizon.
At an annual horizon, the autocorrelation in market-level prices is insignificant. At a
quarterly horizon, only the first lag is positive as the coefficients are mostly insignificant
for additional lags. Thus, market-level price changes in Singapore are not mean reverting.
Instead, the positive quarterly autocorrelation implies that selling a unit with a capital gain
or continuing to hold a unit with a capital loss are suboptimal decisions.
In summary, there is insufficient evidence of mean reversion in property prices to justify
holding units with a capital loss.
4.3 Financing Constraints
Our results are robust to several proxies for financing constraints at both the owner level
(cross-section) and market level (time series). The coefficients for these control variables
10As our data does not contain investor-level identifiers, we cannot test whether owners with a capital loss
purchase another property.
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offer interpretations that are often inconsistent with financing constraints. Moreover, the α3
coefficients for Gain Magnitude that identify financing constraints in the sell propensities are
often insignificant. The discontinuities in the unit-level sell propensities at a zero capital
gain are also inconsistent with financing constraints. Overall, financing constraints do not
appear to be responsible for the greater willingness of investors with a capital gain to sell
their property or accept a lower selling price.
In unreported results, we also include a unit’s original purchase price as an independent
variable to proxy for owner wealth. A higher purchase price is likely associated with a wealth-
ier, and therefore less financially constrained, property investor. However, the inclusion of
this control variable does not alter any of our reported results and its coefficients are generally
insignificant.
4.4 Consumption Motive
The consumption motive underlying property ownership is unlikely to confound our results,
especially for units with a short holding period where investment motives are more relevant.
Furthermore, the high correlation between unit-level prices in Singapore implies that an owner
is not disadvantaged by selling their unit at a loss when property prices are low to purchase
another unit with a similar expected return that better suits their consumption preferences.
Unlike the stock market where dividends or partial liquidations can finance consumption,
owners in Singapore must sell their unit and “downsize” to convert its capital gain into con-
sumption. However, this strategy is limited by smaller units having higher per square foot
prices. Moreover, relocating to a less expensive (geographically remote) real estate market is
less feasible given Singapore’s small land area.
5 Conclusion
The preference of investors to sell assets with a capital gain compared to those with a capital
loss is often attributed to the disposition effect. Instead of conditioning exclusively on the
difference between capital gains and capital losses, realization utility (Barberis and Xiong,
2012) incorporates their magnitude into investor decisions. Intuitively, realization utility
asserts that the larger a capital gain, the greater the utility associated with its realization.
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We find that capital gains and capital losses exert a significant impact on the decisions of
real estate investors. Investors with a capital gain are more likely to sell their property, and
accept a lower selling price, than investors with a capital loss. Consistent with realization
utility, these findings strengthen for investors with a larger capital gain. Thus, neither the
disposition effect nor loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) fully describe the impact of
capital gains on real estate transactions.
In summary, our empirical evidence demonstrates that the likelihood a property is sold
and its selling price are both influenced by realization utility. Intuitively, higher property
prices are likely to induce selling activity, and consequently transaction volume. While data
from Singapore’s real estate market ensures the accuracy of our capital gain estimates, our
support for realization utility can be generalized to other markets where transactions involve
salient reference prices and distinct mental accounts.
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Table 1: Quarterly Inventory of Units and Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the historical inventory of condominium units in Singapore from 1998-2012 according to URA data.
Statistics regarding the historical sale price, square footage (Size), price per square foot (PSF), years held (Holding Period), and number of
condominiums (Condos) are included. Sample coverage is estimated by comparing the units in our sample with the total number of units in
all condominiums. We estimate the total number of units using the website http://www.propertyguru.com.sg/ that records the number of
units in each condominium. The second set of columns pertain to descriptive statistics for sale transactions in the URA data. The average
SGD exchange rate is 1.57 SGD per USD during the 1998-2012 period.
Historical inventory Sales
Avg.
Avg. Avg. Avg. Holding Number Number Housing Sample Avg. Avg. Number
Date SGD Price Size SGD PSF period of condos of units inventory coverage SGD Price SGD PSF of units
03/31/1998 $1,051,727 1,368 $752 1.71 296 25,143 74,516 33.74% $915,655 $646 715
06/30/1998 $1,032,603 1,366 $741 1.85 323 26,949 77,326 34.85% $772,547 $579 1,653
09/30/1998 $1,019,267 1,367 $731 2.02 340 28,283 79,855 35.42% $731,918 $520 1,404
12/31/1998 $981,121 1,369 $701 2.02 364 31,870 82,611 38.58% $623,927 $469 3,628
03/31/1999 $958,907 1,368 $689 2.07 393 35,630 85,739 41.56% $724,518 $530 3,389
06/30/1999 $939,276 1,370 $676 2.01 412 40,685 88,023 46.22% $825,383 $589 5,694
09/30/1999 $937,945 1,372 $675 2.08 407 42,990 88,562 48.54% $934,080 $676 3,450
12/31/1999 $941,532 1,372 $678 2.24 399 44,035 88,328 49.85% $1,069,815 $747 2,169
03/31/2000 $938,453 1,376 $675 2.39 391 44,789 88,414 50.66% $1,004,589 $714 1,960
06/30/2000 $935,370 1,378 $672 2.52 385 45,686 90,077 50.72% $975,417 $685 1,949
09/30/2000 $941,905 1,380 $675 2.64 390 47,059 93,036 50.58% $1,010,087 $720 2,379
12/31/2000 $935,637 1,380 $670 2.81 370 46,779 91,292 51.24% $988,088 $685 1,712
03/31/2001 $931,134 1,377 $669 3.00 370 47,638 92,432 51.54% $790,127 $589 1,439
06/30/2001 $927,397 1,381 $664 3.13 392 49,267 94,011 52.41% $828,095 $595 1,769
09/30/2001 $916,256 1,377 $658 3.24 384 50,081 93,728 53.43% $756,361 $572 2,456
12/31/2001 $916,851 1,372 $663 3.39 429 52,834 99,891 52.89% $766,025 $567 1,647
03/31/2002 $898,802 1,368 $652 3.32 459 59,460 105,266 56.49% $721,795 $558 5,385
06/30/2002 $895,175 1,367 $650 3.43 446 60,776 106,287 57.18% $813,313 $605 2,665
09/30/2002 $885,027 1,364 $644 3.52 447 61,994 105,461 58.78% $774,995 $583 3,138
12/31/2002 $883,883 1,364 $644 3.71 435 61,918 105,266 58.82% $787,355 $574 1,971
03/31/2003 $883,958 1,366 $642 3.90 429 62,006 105,237 58.92% $752,932 $547 857
06/30/2003 $876,354 1,360 $640 4.01 476 66,085 112,050 58.98% $708,454 $580 1,738
09/30/2003 $869,964 1,360 $636 4.12 468 67,404 111,940 60.21% $740,709 $565 2,845
12/31/2003 $861,791 1,360 $630 4.26 450 66,865 110,306 60.62% $739,946 $546 1,574
03/31/2004 $870,933 1,364 $634 4.44 471 68,542 111,291 61.59% $794,985 $563 1,686
06/30/2004 $868,276 1,362 $634 4.53 487 71,306 115,439 61.77% $799,313 $574 2,020
09/30/2004 $866,531 1,358 $635 4.66 515 73,874 118,957 62.10% $771,742 $570 1,970
12/31/2004 $861,485 1,362 $629 4.76 501 74,599 119,600 62.37% $860,473 $648 2,543
03/31/2005 $865,484 1,367 $629 4.89 499 75,506 122,090 61.85% $826,040 $596 1,726
06/30/2005 $868,187 1,367 $632 4.95 533 79,349 126,513 62.72% $853,361 $634 3,092
09/30/2005 $867,566 1,367 $631 4.98 567 83,375 129,694 64.29% $891,882 $624 3,659
12/31/2005 $874,098 1,366 $638 5.02 574 85,735 130,597 65.65% $1,024,978 $741 3,568
03/31/2006 $878,802 1,367 $640 5.10 608 88,695 134,348 66.02% $997,848 $677 3,028
06/30/2006 $886,403 1,367 $644 5.11 634 91,629 135,723 67.51% $1,127,044 $726 4,258
09/30/2006 $896,503 1,368 $648 5.13 652 94,307 137,350 68.66% $1,225,009 $804 4,266
12/31/2006 $920,511 1,370 $661 5.06 685 99,567 141,590 70.32% $1,283,071 $866 6,682
03/31/2007 $946,744 1,370 $678 5.00 720 104,355 144,653 72.14% $1,396,710 $920 6,631
06/30/2007 $990,053 1,369 $706 4.76 745 110,232 148,649 74.16% $1,403,768 $967 11,437
09/30/2007 $1,032,989 1,365 $738 4.69 733 113,144 148,692 76.09% $1,626,858 $1,183 8,327
12/31/2007 $1,034,115 1,357 $743 4.80 669 110,574 144,901 76.31% $1,624,330 $1,124 3,877
03/31/2008 $1,044,978 1,359 $750 4.94 662 109,491 143,833 76.12% $1,289,644 $993 2,386
06/30/2008 $1,046,241 1,362 $749 5.09 673 110,234 144,428 76.33% $1,300,444 $958 2,875
09/30/2008 $1,026,189 1,351 $747 5.22 632 109,173 142,509 76.61% $1,224,799 $916 3,595
12/31/2008 $1,023,065 1,355 $743 5.43 559 103,747 137,774 75.30% $1,056,463 $891 1,375
03/31/2009 $1,038,205 1,356 $751 5.56 734 116,614 154,979 75.25% $841,425 $775 2,860
06/30/2009 $1,063,930 1,358 $767 5.48 830 124,997 163,397 76.50% $1,135,040 $890 7,733
09/30/2009 $1,087,631 1,354 $786 5.28 843 130,665 167,945 77.80% $1,310,650 $991 10,586
12/31/2009 $1,106,006 1,352 $804 5.32 849 132,844 171,235 77.58% $1,364,717 $1,065 5,638
03/31/2010 $1,122,747 1,348 $821 5.28 869 136,638 173,590 78.71% $1,416,260 $1,147 7,561
06/30/2010 $1,148,100 1,345 $844 5.19 890 141,466 177,475 79.71% $1,439,551 $1,155 8,517
09/30/2010 $1,149,175 1,332 $856 5.19 886 143,285 179,633 79.77% $1,289,427 $1,129 7,043
12/31/2010 $1,167,766 1,330 $873 5.18 892 146,318 182,752 80.06% $1,393,502 $1,211 7,292
03/31/2011 $1,178,641 1,322 $889 5.19 910 149,464 190,918 78.29% $1,345,184 $1,197 6,074
06/30/2011 $1,194,108 1,315 $908 5.16 920 153,371 191,472 80.10% $1,350,494 $1,217 8,026
09/30/2011 $1,199,482 1,309 $918 5.21 890 153,745 192,440 79.89% $1,351,511 $1,175 6,325
12/31/2011 $1,194,563 1,300 $924 5.26 871 156,113 194,138 80.41% $1,292,239 $1,177 6,062
03/31/2012 $1,187,465 1,292 $927 5.34 911 161,714 200,706 80.57% $1,087,204 $1,149 6,116
06/30/2012 $1,202,069 1,284 $945 5.32 973 169,696 210,450 80.64% $1,274,543 $1,194 8,412
09/30/2012 $1,215,034 1,282 $955 5.38 980 172,968 212,817 81.28% $1,346,656 $1,202 6,891
12/31/2012 $1,217,082 1,271 $966 5.35 840 168,021 202,519 82.97% $1,400,292 $1,245 7,505
Overall $991,691 1,355 $726 4.21 598 89,693 131,913 64.32% $1,046,226 $886 249,228
Table 2: Price Correlation within Condominiums
This table summarizes the results from the pricing model in Equation (1) from 1995 to 2012 based on quarterly indicator variables,
size, and floor level, PSFi,t =
∑
t βt Quarteri,t+βs Sizei+βf Floor Leveli+i,t. This pricing model is estimated for each individual
condominium. Condominiums that average fewer than two sale transactions per quarter are excluded from the pricing model.
Each observation i represents the sale of a unit in a particular condominium during quarter t. Sale transactions are from the
URA REALIS database for condominiums in Singapore. Average coefficients across all 1,014 condominiums are reported along
with the distribution of their R2.
Number of condominiums 1,014 1,014
Quarterly indicator variables Yes Yes
Average Size coefficient -0.13
Average t-statistic (8.90)
Average Floor Level coefficient 7.15
Average t-statistic (6.13)
Adjusted R2 Percentiles
1% 0.004 0.363
10% 0.182 0.716
25% 0.666 0.864
Median 0.872 0.930
75% 0.928 0.958
90% 0.956 0.973
99% 0.980 0.988
Mean 0.738 0.880
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Table 9: Autocorrelation in Property Market Returns
This table contains the results from regressing market-level returns on lagged returns where returns are based on percentage
changes in the market-level PSF every quarter. The quarterly market-level PSF is computed by averaging all transactions within
each condominium during a quarter, and then averaging these condominium-level PSF averages across all condominiums. t-
statistics are in parentheses with *, **, and *** representing the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Quarterly horizon Annual horizon
Return t-1 0.590*** 0.714*** 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.160 0.208 0.251 0.454
(6.03) (5.93) (5.61) (5.47) (0.61) (0.75) (1.04) (1.35)
Return t-2 -0.209* -0.139 -0.135 -0.256 -0.250 -0.316
(1.74) (0.92) (0.88) (0.92) (1.05) (1.18)
Return t-3 -0.105 -0.115 0.330 0.385
(0.85) (0.74) (1.33) (1.38)
Return t-4 0.013 -0.172
(0.10) (0.59)
Intercept 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.036 0.047 0.056 0.043
(0.78) (0.97) (0.96) (0.90) (0.88) (1.06) (1.43) (0.93)
Observations 70 69 68 67 16 15 14 13
Adjusted R2 0.339 0.358 0.358 0.346 -0.044 -0.060 -0.017 -0.063
(a) Disposition Effect (b) Realization Utility
(c) Belief Revision (d) Financing Constraints
Figure 1 This figure illustrates the sell propensities based on the predictions of the dispo-
sition effect (a), realization utility (b), belief revision (c), and financing constraints (d).
Figure 2 This figure illustrates the price and volume dynamics in Singapore’s real estate
market during our sample period. The market-level price per square foot (PSF) of sale
transactions and the corresponding transaction volume are reported every quarter. The
market-level PSF is computed by first averaging the PSF of all sale transactions within
each condominium, and then averaging these condominium-level averages across all condo-
miniums.
Figure 3 The top figure plots the sell propensity against the magnitude of a unit’s capital
gain for all units whose holding period is less than or equal to three years. The bottom
figure plots these sell propensities for units whose capital gain (return since purchase) is
between -20% and 20%. Each quarter-unit observation is sorted into 1%-bins. We exclude
bins with fewer than 100 observations.
Figure 4 This figure plots the selling price premium against the magnitude of a unit’s
capital gain for all units whose holding period is less than or equal to three years. The
bottom figure plots this premium for units whose capital gain (return since purchase) is
between -20% and 20%. Each quarter-unit observation is sorted into 1%-bins. We exclude
bins with fewer than 10 observations.
